Rakesh Chhetri
Centre for Protection of Minorities and Against Racism and Discrimination in Bhutan (CEMARD-Bhutan)

National Security : A Bhutanese Perspective

In: The Kathmandu Post, December 25, 1997

The concept of Bhutanese nationalsecurity includes three type of eventualities:Security from external threats; the strategic environment and unsettled periphery; and the internal factors such as externally induced domestic upheavals that could unsettle the ‘core national values’. These continue to remain the core national concerns in its national security perspective. The national security perspective examined here pertains to the sovereignty of Bhutanese state and its territorial independence.

As a tiny state, Bhutan is geo-strategically located between two giant nations of Asia - China in the north and India in the south. Bhutan recognises that India needs it to further India’s own geo-strategic ends in the region. Thus, by skilful manipulation and clever exploitation of these needs, Bhutan has so far been successful to further its own goals at relatively low political cost.As a modern nation-state it stepped out of its self-isolation in late fifties. Its national security perception has been evolved through four stages.

Firstly, Bhutanese national security perception was greatly influenced and shaped by the geopolitical events in Tibet in the late fifties, especially with the Chinese integration of Tibet. This compelled it to sign a joint defence agreement with India in 1965. Secondly, the Indian annexation of Sikkim in 1975 made Bhutan apprehensive of its giant southern neighbour. Thirdly, Indian involvement in the Sri Lankan domestic conflict and the deployment of Indian Peace Keeping Force there heightened its suspicion towards India. This made it to re-assess its vulnerability in the south too, which led to a gradual re-orientation of its foreign policy imperatives. Thus, Bhutan started to look beyond the southern neighbour and established bilateral diplomatic relationships with other countries. Fourthly, since early eighties, armed struggle in Darjeeling and the separatist movements being waged in the north-east India bordering Bhutan have heightened its security concern and sensitivity.

It committed a national security blunder by allowing the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and Bodo insurgents of Assam into its territories. These organisations are outlawed by the Government of India.In addition to a decade old internal political instability in the Bhutanese state, it is now facinga growing threat of likely Indian military intervention in its territory to flush out the Assamese insurgents. Sometimes around the mid 1997, China has reportedly expressed its concern on the presence of large Indian troops in Bhutan. The Chinese sensitivity has come as a shot in the arms to the Bhutanese Government vis-à-vis Indian military intervention, at least momentarily. The Chinese sensitivity was rooted in the likely Bhutanese and Indian military build along the borders.

Security Umbrella : Bhutan signed joint defence agreement with India in 1965, and agreed to deploy Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT), which brought it under the direct Indian security umbrella. Security umbrella is the result of acquiescence to Indian dominion in its security and foreign affairs, as the two are inter-linked. The then tenuous regime not experienced in statecraft, intricacies and complexities of security, simply mortgaged the future of state sovereignty for a modicum of regime’s security at that moment.

However, the Bhutanese security sensitivities and imperatives today are entirely different from that of sixties and even differ drastically from India’s. China is considered the biggest security threat to Indian perception. No issue epitomises Indian security perception more than the Chinese threat. The India security umbrella implies that Bhutan must treat any threat to India as also a threat to itself. However, the real question is – security against whom? Will India come to Bhutan’s rescue in the event of Chinese aggression? The security umbrella is nothing more than a fantasy of Indian security agencies. The Bhutanese security today means a distinct national identity, political sovereignty, cultural survival, economic and political stability, while India has something more.

The IMTRAT itself will prove an eventual security threat and catastrophe to Bhutan’s sovereignty, were she to establish diplomatic and bilateral trade relations with China at the cost of Indian sensitivity. If today, Bhutan finds itself on the crossroads of national security contradictions, it is because of its naivety. It never had a clear cut national security policy in the past and relied absolutely on India. It never even thought developing competent professionals on security and policy matters, which in fact, is a necessity for a small country of its stature. India will never accept being by-passed on any matters concerning its security vis-à-vis China. Indian stakes in Bhutan are too high. Under security umbrella Bhutan is not independent to determine and decide on its own scrutiny and foreign policy options. Any Bhutanese independent overture will thus be an Indian security nightmare.

External threat : Bhutan perceives threat from both India and China. It has unresolved border disputes with China and is a potential threat to its security in the north. There had been more than a dozen Chinese incursions into Bhutanese territory in the north. China spurns Bhutan’s hosting of Indian army, the special Indo-Bhutan defence pact against it and Indian ‘forward defence policy’. Chinese occupation of Tibet and Sino-Indian hostilities of 1962 have left tremendous impacton Bhutanese security perception. Hence, Bhutan is highly sensitive and eager to resolve its boundary disputes with China quietly and amicably, even by acceding to Chinese proposal of exchanging disputed territories. China has offered a package which includes the resolution of border dispute, establishment of diplomatic missions and trade relationship. However, whether Bhutan could convince India of its sensitivity is yet to be seen.

Bhutan was gravely alarmed at the Indian annexation of Sikkim in 1975 and its intervention in the domestic conflict in Sri Lanka in 1985. King Jigme started debriefing sessions with senior bureaucrats on matters of national security during late seventies and early eighties. In all such meetings he articulately echoed his fear from mighty neighbours. The author was also present in such meetings. The king took a number of decisions to reduce economic dependence on India to minimise the security risk from it. New multi-lateral and bilateral aid channels were explored and established.

Bangladesh, Singapore and Kuwaitwere new export destinations. Since 1980, Bhutanese markets were flooded with foreign consumer goods, hitherto exclusively an Indian domain. New diplomatic relationships were established. In a span of seven years, Bhutan made considerable progress in reducing its economic dependence on India and was slowly moving away from the Indian sphere of influence. However, its desire to crush the democratic movement brought it more closer to India.

Externally induced domestic upheavals : In the initial days of pro-democracy movement, Bhutan described it as inspired andmisguided by “Indians’ from across the borders. It was a long standing and intrinsic Bhutanese security perception that domestic upheaval will commence inthe south and with Indian support. This perception springs from the role India played during Sikkimese crisis and more recently in Sri Lanka. Bhutan is fortunately safe from the threat of the “Macedonian syndrome”, of externally instigated domestic ethnic upheavals as in the case of Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. Its concern is that India will eventually use the pro-democracy elements in its pursuit of geo-strategic ends in the eastern Himalayas, the day it decides to leave the Indian security umbrella.

Unsettled periphery : North-east India is a classic case of unsettled periphery for Bhutan. There are insurgencies in almost all states – Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh in the north-east. Bhutanese concerns are mainly derived from the ULFA and Bodo militants of Assam state which borders southern Bhutan. Indian security forces under a combined command has launched combing operation against them. They are operating against Indiafrom their hide-outs in Bhutan. The Indian Government has been pressurising the Bhutanese Government for joint military operations against the insurgents in Bhutan. So far, it has not accepted the Indian request on technical grounds. However, unless these insurgents leave Bhutan on their own, the threat of Indian military intervention in its territory looms large. Any Indian military intervention in Bhutan will invite serious Chinese concerns. Is it going to be a potential spotof Sino-Indian rivalry and clashes of strategic interests in near future?

Bhutanese sovereignty : Bhutan never had either ‘equi-distance’ or ‘equi-proximity’ or even ‘neutralization’ policy as are practised by so many small countries of the world and it never needed one. Bhutan is highly concerned of its security both in the north and in the south and isfully aware of the futility of the Indian security umbrella in the event of direct Chinese intervention. Historically, both China and India have been security threat to it, if one has invaded its northern neighbour the other has annexed its western neighbour.It will therefore be in its long term national interests to accept the Chinese offer and sign a final border agreement. A small country like Bhutan cannot afford to have unresolved disputes for long with mighty neighbours.

Every country small or big must be free to eliminate any threat against its sovereignty through diplomatic efforts. It will eliminate security threat from the north if Bhutan establishes normal diplomatic relationship with China without jeopardising its relationship with India and without using one against the other in pursuit of its own national interests. The end of Cold War might have changed international security perceptions, but Bhutan’s security perception is very much intact. Bhutan must enter the next millennium as a politically sovereign nation without having to obtain Indian ‘guidance’ on matters of its security and foreign policy. Surely now and for some time to come, Bhutan is destined to walk through a security tightrope. The repatriation of Bhutanese refugees has now become an integral part of the geopolitical complexities of the region.