Rakesh Chhetri
Centre for Protection of Minorities and Against Racism and Discrimination in Bhutan (CEMARD-Bhutan)

The essence of Bhutanese foreign policy

In: The Kathmandu Post, January 30, 1998

The attainment of external goals are the essence of the foreign policy of any nation. Like any nation, the ultimate aim of Bhutanese foreign policy is the attainment of its national interests. The goal of current Bhutanese foreign policy centres around five major objectives, viz., search for national security, preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity; economic development; furtherance of Bhutan-India relationship; expansion of external relations; suppression of pro democratic movement and stalling the repatriation of Bhutanese refugees. The last two became an integral part of foreign policy since early nineties.

King Jigme outlined the basic framework of Bhutanese foreign policy in May, 1983 thus, ‘Our aim continues to be threefold; Firstly, we are committed politically to a strong and loyal sense of nationhood to ensuring the peace and security of our citizens and the sovereign territorial integrity of our land. Secondly, to achieve economic self-reliance and thirdly to preserve the ancient religious and cultural heritage that has for so many centuries strengthened and enriched our lives’.

Since late sixties, new political and economic developments in Bhutan have brought changes in its foreign policy goals. Following factors have influenced the growth of Bhutanese foreign policy and its formulations. First, the realisation of its geo-strategic importance between two Asian giant nations - China and India, has provided profound and continual impact on its foreign policy. Secondly, Bhutan’s treaty relations with India, heavy dependence on India economic aid and its land-locked status hindered the growth of independent diplomacy. Thirdly, absence of political parties and non-subscriptionto any of the large ideologies that determined the course of world politics until the eighties had direct bearing onthe growth of country’s relatively stable but limited external relations. It never had a ‘neutral’ or ‘equi-proximity’ or ‘equi-distance’ foreign policy towards its giant neighbours.There was set foreign policy agenda in any given period of time. Fourthly, lack of educated and professional manpower, financial resources and traditional mindset of Bhutanese society also influenced the conduct of foreign policy at very minimal. As a traditional society, country’s needs were also very minimal in the past. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created only in 1972, before that it was a part of Ministry of Development. Until mid seventies, Bhutanese foreign policy was largely Indo-centric and inward looking. The growth of external relations can be grouped into four major heads – relationship with India, multilateral, regional and international bilateral relationships.

Relationship with India: Bhutan signed a political Treaty with independent India in 1949, much before it stepped out of its self-imposed isolation in early sixties. According to this treaty at least theoretically, Bhutan is required to consult India in the conduct of its external relations. The formal diplomatic relations between Bhutan and India at Ambassadorial level was established only on 8 August 1978. India has been the major foreign aid donor to all five year economic development plans of Bhutan. It has financed all major hydro-projects in Bhutan. It finances the entire military budget of Bhutan. It is the largest foreign trade partner of Bhutan.

India thinks it is responsible for Bhutanese security and its army is stationed in Bhutan. Bhutan’s alleged tilt towards China in Indian perception and its hosting of India’s north-east militants have been the major irritants in the otherwise smooth Bhutan-India relationship in the recent past. It has always supported India in the UN and tows Indian line evenin the SAARC.

Multilateral diplomacy: During a limited period of late seventies and early eighties, there has been a major structural shift in its foreign policy vis-à-vis India. Bhutan perceived bilateral relations with India politically risky and uncertain, especially after the Indian annexation of Sikkim in 1975. Hence, it preferred to and opted for multilateralism and even international bilateralismin its subsequent stages of economic development in the late seventies and early eighties.

Multilateralism, since no political strings areattached to it, was perceived safer and political risk free option. The growing need to preserve country’s distinct national identity, sovereignty and territorial integrity began to be articulated among the Bhutanese elite in early eighties. This led to the focused views on the need to minimise and reduce the country’s heavy economic dependence on Indian aid for financing its economic development programmes. Multilateralism was thus allowed to act as a balancing fact or to both political and economic influences from India.

Bhutan received substantial economic aid through multilateral channels. Various UN agencies have contributed substantially to the core sector of socio-economy of the country such as education, agriculture, live-stock development, forestry, environment, industry, health, children, training of bureaucracy, technical co-operation etc.

Bhutan joined the Colombo Plan in 1963 and the Universal Postal Union in 1969. It was admitted to theUnited Nations in1971. Bhutan became the member of. UNCTAD in 1971, ESCAP in 1972, NAM in 1973, IFAD, IMF, IBRD, IDA and FAO in 1981, WHO, UNESCO and ADB in 1982, UNIDO in 1983, ITU in 1988, ICAO in 1989, ECOSOC in 1992. Bhutan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) signed general agreement in 1973, and finally, despite the Indian reservation, the UNDP opened its office in Thimphu in 1979. Bhutan is now a member of more than 150 international organisations.

International bilateralism : The most important factor of Bhutanese foreign policy has been its demonstrated apathy to the establishment of formal diplomatic relationship with any of the permanent members of UN Security Council. Surprisingly, it does not have formal diplomatic relationship with its next door mighty neighbour China. There has never been any exchange of state visits between the two neighbours. It may be due to the invisible Indian pressure. It rather chose to establish international bilateral diplomatic relationship with the ‘non-organic powers’, the industrialised nations and members of the OECD, like the Scandinavian countries, Japan, South Korea etc. This clearly indicates its preference of international bilateralism was determined by its desire to move away from the economic and political influences of India. Japan, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Finland, Canada, Sweden and Australia are the prominent aid donors.

It established formal diplomatic relations with Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, EEC, Norway and Netherlands in 1985; Kuwait, Japan and Finland in 1986; South Korea in 1987, Austria in 1989, Thailand in 1991, Bahrain in 1992. Consular relations were also established with Hongkong and Singapore in 1982 and Macaw in 1985.

Regional diplomacy : Bhutan’s diplomatic initiatives in South Asian region was to balance the Indian hegemony. It established resident diplomatic relationship with Bangladesh in 1980. In no time, Dhaka became the largest export market for Bhutanese goods in terms of hard currency. Bhutanese security perception that domestic upheaval will commence in the southern districts brought it closer to Nepal in the past. This fear resulted in the establishment ofdiplomatic relations with Nepal in 1983.

Bhutan probably assumed that the political relationship with the Nepalese monarchy, who is held in awe by the Nepalese, will also bolster respect for Bhutanese monarchy among the Lhotshampas, and thwart any agitation by them against it. However, the political crisis that arose subsequently was due to its own racist policy towards the southerners. Now, Bhutan-Nepal relation has touched all time low since the arrival of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal in 1990. It established non-resident diplomatic relations with Maldives in 1984, Sri Lanka, 1987 and Pakistan in 1990. Bhutan joined the SAARC in 1983.

Bhutanese residential diplomatic missions are located in New Delhi, UN Headquarters, New York, UN Offices, Geneva, Kuwait City, Bangkok and Dhaka. India and Bangladesh have their embassies in Thimphu. The SNV- Netherlands, DANIDA, HELVETAS, UNDP, FAO, WFP and WHO maintain their resident representatives in Thimphu.

Stand on Refugees : The entire Ministry of Foreign affairs and its diplomatic apparatus are now fully engaged in campaigning for the preservation of the institution of absolute monarchy in the guise of preserving the ‘ancient culture’ and against the repatriation of Bhutanese refugees and to tarnish the image of democratic movement through concocted misinformation propaganda.

It is high time that the Bhutanese regime realise the real problems lie wholly inside Bhutan and desists from behaving irresponsibly. Its diplomatic initiatives to stall the repatriation of its citizen refugees shows its political immaturity. It could be at the best, momentary. It has created the refugee problems and the onus lies on it to solve the problem also. To put blame on others for its internal political crisis is to behave like an ostrich. The long term solution depends on the repatriation of refugees. By trying to stall the repatriation and allowing to the problem to linger, it is only inviting the security-risk to the already politically instable nation. If Bhutan takes back its citizens from Nepal, it will definitely bolster its image in the comity of nations.

(The author is a Bhutanese Political/Security Analyst)

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